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In the second part of the article, I show how, after 
independence, Zambia dealt with a complex geopo-
litical entanglement, partially inherited from colonial 
planning and partially generated by the end of direct 
forms of imperialism, which required the rerouting 
of the export and import of resources and the rebal-
ancing of uneven territorial structures. To do so, the 
postcolonial nation state re-applied the instruments 
inherited by the ‘colonial logistic’ but, for lack of 
resources and expertise, it opened the door to a set 
of international patrons.
The analysis of infrastructure development in 
postcolonial Zambia illustrates the competing strat-
egies through which imperialist powers attempted 
to secure a new form of control on Africa and eluci-
dates the role of logistics as a decisive tool to shape 
the African territory at the various scales.
Colonial logistics
In modern philosophical thought and European polit-
ical practice and imaginary, the colony represents the 
site where (…) “peace” is more likely to take on the 
face of a “war without end”. (Mbembe, 2003)1
Now broadly considered as the sum of infrastruc-
tures and processes needed to efficiently relocate 
goods from the point of production to the point of 
consumption, the notion of logistics was initially 
associated with military operations such as the 
planning of defence systems, troops dislocation, 
and goods supply.
Introduction
This article addresses the logistical aspects of 
colonial and postcolonial governmental practices 
and the way in which such practices structured the 
African territory. In particular, it focuses on Zambia 
(Northern Rhodesia at time of British domination), a 
landlocked country located in the centre of Southern 
Africa, whose historical evolution, since it was 
conquered at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
is deeply intertwined with the discovery, extraction 
and export of copper and with the import of fossil 
fuel. It does so by presenting a series of episodes of 
Zambian history, from its foundation until the early 
postcolonial phase.
In the first part of the text, I introduce the concept 
of ‘colonial logistics’ intended as the modification of 
territories for military and political domination, and 
the extraction and export of resources. Through 
the observation of Northern Rhodesia, its founda-
tion, its territorial delineation and the first planning 
of its capital city, the article demonstrates how 
European states, especially in the early colonial 
era, did not aim at governing the colonies with the 
same uniformity and intensity that was applied to 
their own territories, but rather to define a rational 
and controllable geography of lines and enclaves 
in order to efficiently control and exploit African 
resources. With the goal of efficiency, the logistical 
governmental mode of colonial power expanded the 
planetary infrastructure of capitalist accumulation 
and rearranged new territorial structures and hier-
archies at different scales.
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The first colonial power to impose its presence 
on what would become Northern Rhodesia, was a 
private company, the British South Africa Company 
(BSAC) led by Cecil John Rhodes. In the second 
half of the nineteen century, Rhodes and his 
company’s paramilitary forces acquired and ruled 
over vast African territories reaching from the Cape 
in the south to the Zambesi river in the north. The 
Chartered BSAC combined the role of a private 
enterprise with the legitimation of the Victorian 
state. It traded with local chiefs for land acquisi-
tion, built and owned railways, and extracted and 
exported metal ores and diamonds toward South 
Africa’s ports.5 [Fig. 1]
The oddly shaped territory of Northern Rhodesia, 
once part of the Lozi and Bemba empires, was 
the result of infrastructural expansionism, geopo-
litical contingencies and of the discovery of copper 
deposits.6 Rhodes’s imperial ambition was to 
expand the ‘Rhodesia Railway’ to the north, in order 
to reach the British colonies on the Mediterranean 
Sea through the envisioned, legendary ‘Cape to 
Cairo Railway’ but, after crossing the Zambesi river 
at the Victoria waterfalls, in 1905, the ambitious 
mission had to be aborted. Unable to cross German 
East Africa and the Belgian Congo, the railway 
was converted into an exporting tool for the copper 
deposits which were then discovered in the region.7 
Known to some of the oldest civilisations, since 
the invention of the telegraph and the telephone, 
copper had become the most needed non-precious 
metal for electrical and communication wiring.
The trains of the Rhodesia Railway, departing 
from Port Elizabeth or Durban, would stop in 
Wankie (Southern Rhodesia) to collect coal, and 
then proceed to the north. Once they reached the 
Copperbelt, coal was unloaded and used to activate 
the mining engines while copper was loaded and 
shipped southward to South Africa and Mozambique 
and from there to the whole world. [Fig. 2]
In the early colonial era, military expeditions and 
private industrial companies, both supported by 
Western governments, conquered and acquired 
African territories and administered, exploited and 
controlled them through the construction of railways 
and roads, the planning of urban settlements and 
military outposts, the arrangement of plantations, 
mines, and reserves, and the management of trading 
and exporting. This ‘imperialism of free trade’2, as it 
was defined by Gallagher and Robinson, was not 
aiming at imposing direct political control on the 
conquered land, but at its exploitation through mili-
tary and paramilitary violence.
My thesis is that the hybrid nature of colonial 
administration merged the martial and the neoliberal 
characters of logistics, producing a governmental 
strategy that I define as ‘colonial logistics’. Colonial 
logistics is about imposing rationality and efficiency 
on the unpredictable and the uncontrolled – wild 
lands, savage people and inefficient processes – in 
order to transform nature into a resource for 
commodity production and capital accumulation.3 
Colonial logistics produced specific spatial and 
social relations at the local, regional and continental 
scales.
Rhodesia Railway
Like many other modernist tendencies, logistics 
in its various forms found broader application in 
the colonies. Colonialists’ first ally was the railway 
or ‘the permanent way’ as it was often called. In 
‘Railway Imperialims’, Ronald Robinson observes 
how ‘the railroad was not only the servant but also 
the principal generator of informal empire; in this 
sense imperialism was a function of the railroad’.4 
By drawing straight lines of steel, European engi-
neers could impose their order on the unfriendly 
African landscape, control times and distances 
within unknown territories, and define a new geog-
raphy of lines, points, nodes, axes, and cities they 
could understand and control.
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Fig. 1: Map of Rhodesia Railway with construction dates. Lusaka is not marked between Kalomo and Broken Hill. 
Source: https://www.britishempire.co.uk.
Fig. 2: Rhodesia Railway train exporting copper bars. Source: Horizon, February 1965.
Fig. 3: Lusaka old town, view from the north, about 1950. Source: George Kay, A Social Geography of Zambia. 
(London: University of London Press, 1971).
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Rhodesia and South Africa. This dependence would 
continue to affect her future development long after 
independence.
Railways were not the exclusive prerogative of 
the British empire; French, German, Belgian and 
Portuguese railways were also penetrating the 
continent, each of them with different aims and 
standards. The fragmented and outward-oriented 
logic of colonial infrastructures systems, together 
with the establishment of national and internal 
borders is the main cause of the current uneven 
geography of the continent.12
Lusaka
Lusaka, the capital of Northern Rhodesia from 
1931, was established in 1905 as a technical stop 
on the railway line. Steam engines needed periodi-
cally to be refilled with water; therefore, the BSAC 
built loading and unloading platforms every twenty 
miles. Named after the chief of nearby Lenje Village, 
Lusaka was twenty miles north of the Chipongwe 
stop and offered a flat dolomitic soil and consistent 
water reservoirs. In 1906, when the railway construc-
tion ended at the border with the Congo, many who 
were left without work purchased farmlands in its 
surroundings. The White Fathers mission and the 
BSAC also settled in its proximity. Thanks to the 
growing farming activities, a marketing centre grew 
around the train stop where products were loaded 
and unloaded.
By 1913 the new settlement included a post 
office, a veterinary office, three mills for grinding 
maize and other grains, two lime kilns, a mission 
school serving the farmer’s community, a govern-
ment school, several shops, a small hotel, a rifle 
club and a sports’ club. In the same year, the BSAC 
developed a simple master plan to control the 
growth of the township.13 The railway and the dirt 
track running parallel to it – named ‘Cairo Road’ in 
memory of Rhodes’s imperialist vision – constituted 
Thanks to the efficiency of the railway and the 
stable growth of the price of copper, the mining 
industry of the Copperbelt flourished and the railway 
line became the economic backbone of the colony. 
Most urban settlements, industries, and economic 
activities developed within a narrow area along the 
rail line while the sparse population lived of subsist-
ence agriculture in the less accessible provinces.8
In 1924 the territories acquired by the BSAC 
through agreements with local chiefs were sold 
to the British government, who assumed adminis-
trative responsibility over Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe), and 
Nyasaland (now Malawi).9
In order to encourage European migration to 
Northern Rhodesia, the Colonial Office decided to 
set aside plots of land for exclusive European use. 
The most fertile, productive and accessible swaths 
of land – mainly along the railway and around the 
mines – were designated as ‘Crown Land’ and 
could be purchased by white settlers. Africans were 
not allowed to permanently reside on Crown Land 
and had to relocate to the ‘native reserves’. The 
reserves soon became overcrowded and shortages 
of land and food pushed the African population 
to migrate towards the mining and urban areas 
seeking wage labour.10
In order to limit the flow of migration, the admin-
istration determined that only single African male 
workers were allowed to temporarily live around 
cities and mines but despite the limitation, the 
demographic imbalance between the urban and the 
rural areas kept on growing.11 The divide between 
‘coloured’ and white became a territorial and an 
urban issue, solved, at a different scales, with the 
definition of new borders and racial enclaves. The 
north-south orientation of the Zambian urbanisa-
tion pattern reflected the political and economic 
dependence of Northern Rhodesia on Southern 
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presence of various private British companies in the 
most strategic areas of Africa convinced the British 
government to renounce to colonial sovereignty and 
negotiate the conditions for independence.17
In 1964, Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the nation-
alist movement from the early 1950s, became 
the first president of Zambia with the support of 
the United National Independence Party (UNIP). 
His own philosophy, was a mixture of ‘Fabian 
socialism, nineteenth-century liberalism, Christian 
morality and idealisation of the communal values of 
Zambia’s pre-capitalist past’.18 Kaunda’s domestic 
politics was characterised by socialist-oriented 
authoritarianism, which led to the creation of a state 
monopoly for manufacturing and trading companies, 
and the acquisition of 51% of the mining compa-
nies’ shares.19 At the same time, beyond political 
ideology, he maintained opportunistic and prag-
matic foreign relations with Britain, the USA, the 
Communist Bloc, and the non-aligned movement.
In the year of its independence, Zambia was the 
third larger copper producer in the world (after the 
Congo and Chile), and exported between 50,000 
and 60,000 tonnes of Copper a month. Copper 
constituted over 90% of Zambian export and 
almost 50% of government revenue.20 During the 
1960s, thanks to the high price of copper, Zambia 
was rated one of the most prosperous countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa but its little-diversified economy 
depended heavily on copper price fluctuation and 
on its ability to negotiate favourable trading agree-
ments with neighbouring countries in order to 
maintain the flow of copper and fuel.21
Throughout colonial domination and during the 
first year of Kaunda’s government, all of the copper 
export and ninety-five percent of imports had been 
shipped via railway through the British controlled 
territories to the ports of South Africa, but after 
Southern Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of 
the main axis of a linear gridded master plan 
expanding for two miles along the railway.14 Logistic 
and storage spaces were located towards the rail 
line while the main public buildings and services 
sprang up along Cairo Road. White colonists also 
settled within the gridded structure while African 
workers lived in compounds south of the town. 
[Fig. 3]
In 1931 the colonial government of Northern 
Rhodesia decided to relocate its capital from 
Livingston to a more central location. Lusaka, 
which in 1931 had a population of four hundred and 
seventy Europeans, was chosen for its favourable 
position and pleasant climate. In 1935 a new master 
plan for the expansion of the capital city to the East 
of the existing settlement was developed by the 
British architect S. D. Adshead. The new capital was 
planned as a colonial, therefore racially divided, 
garden city of tree-lined boulevard and big plots for 
the Europeans’ villas. Lusaka Old Town survived as 
the commercial core of the city.15
Originally deployed for military settlement, the 
grid became the preferred device for the structuring 
of new colonial settlements. The quintessence of all 
ordering structures, it was broadly used by colon-
isers as an instrument of space rationalisation. It 
recreated a known and recognisable environment 
and its compact layout provided feelings of urbanity 
and protection against the unfamiliar African land-
scape. With its image of scientific rationality, the 
grid, a non-figurative configuration with clear 
internal rules, can be read as the representation of 
the modern.16 The exemplary grid of Lusaka’s first 
master plan, in contrast to to the organic shapes of 
the existing local settlements, evokes the colonial 
administration’s self-proclaimed civilising mission.
Zambia 1964–1965
In the late 1950s, the possibility of maintaining good 
post-independence economic relations and the 
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Congo, since its independence in 1960, was facing 
acute political tentions and Angola was still under 
Portuguese colonial rule.27 [Fig. 4]
Tanzania, Zambia’s most politically reliable neigh-
bour, had been independent since 1961 and was 
governed by Julius Nyerere, who shared Kaunda’s 
socialist and pan-Africanist believes. Despite the 
fact that both countries had been British colonies 
since WWI, the only physical connection between 
the two was the ‘Great North Road’, an unpaved 
track built in 1917 to convey British troops from 
Northern Rhodesia to the German East African 
front. Since then, Tanzania, together with Kenya 
and Uganda, was part of the British East African 
administrative unit which had almost no exchange 
with Northern Rhodesia and the British Central 
Africa Federation.28
Early in 1966, an oil airlift was organised by the 
British, American and Canadian air forces to solve 
Zambia’s oil crisis. Cargo planes flew oil in from 
Dar es Salaam and Nairobi while trucks imported 
oil and exported copper via the Great North Road. 
This provisory solution proved inefficient; the cost 
of the air-lift was too high and a big quantity of 
oil was consumed by the heavily loaded planes. 
Furthermore, only a few months after the UDI, the 
unsurfaced and poorly engineered Great North 
Road became impassable.29
The closing of the border with Southern 
Rhodesia, the consequent lack of fuel and the stack 
of copper waiting to be shipped out of the country 
required a prompt and durable solution. Kaunda 
and Nyerere envisioned a double long-term answer 
to Zambia’s isolation: an oil pipeline and a railway. 
Both infrastructures would run almost parallel to the 
Great North Road and connect Zambia to the Indian 
Ocean at Dar es Salaam. The pipeline had to supply 
oil to the mines while the ‘freedom railway’, as it was 
often called, would guarantee the flow of copper 
with the minimum need to import fuel and vehicles.
Independence (UDI) of 1965, Zambia was forced 
to secure a new outlet to the sea.22 The self-
proclaimed independence of the Rhodesian white 
minority, condemned by Britain and unanimously by 
the United Nations, entailed a complete embargo 
on goods to and through the country.23 The UN 
economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia 
affected Zambia more than the ruling white elites 
of Rhodesia itself, who could still count on illegal 
South African and Portuguese supplies, through 
Mozambique and Angola. The effect of the trading 
ban on the Zambian economy revealed its depend-
ency on foreign imports and on Southern Rhodesia’s 
infrastructure.24
With the UDI, the border between Zambia and 
Southern Rhodesia became the border between 
independent Africa, in the north, and the white and 
colonial south. Tensions along this African iron 
curtain was worsened by the fact that Zambia and 
Tanzania, together with Cuba, the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia, and other socialist countries, were 
offering support and protection to armed groups 
fighting for freedom in Mozambique and Rhodesia.25 
Zambia found itself surrounded by enemy territo-
ries; the only accessible route toward the sea were 
the Benguela railway, running through the Congo 
and Angola, and the Great North Road, a dirt track 
passing through Tanzania.
The Benguela railway, built between 1903 and 
1930 by the Portuguese government, connected 
the mining area of Katanga in the south of Congo to 
the Angolan port of Lobito on the Atlantic Ocean.26 
During colonial times Northern Rhodesia made 
little use of the Portuguese railway because of 
binding agreements between British-controlled 
protectorates. After the UDI, Zambia began to 
use the Benguela route but there were serious 
technical limitations to the railway’s capacity, so 
it could not fully comply with Zambia’s sudden 
request. Furthermore, the Congo and Angola were 
considered unstable commercial partners; the 
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Fig. 4: Zambia’s alternative transport routes after Southern Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The 
Great North Road connects Lusaka to Dar es Salaam. Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Foreign 
Trade Routes of Zambia 1n 1973. Report No. E/CN.14/ECO/61, 8 June 1973.
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in Africa right after the end of the Second World 
War.35 Supporting the independence claim of colo-
nised countries and despite Italy’s colonial past, ENI 
gained a new image of political neutrality within the 
Cold War, allowing it acces to the markets of various 
African nations.36
The construction of the pipeline started from ENI’s 
refinery in Dar es Salaam in May 1967 and ended in 
the Zambian Copperbelt, where a terminal tank and 
a distribution system were developed in September 
1968. A core team of Italian engineers and techni-
cians was sent to Tanzania to collaborate with local 
workers. The fourty five thousand tons of steel pipe, 
imported from Italy via the Cape, because of the 
Suez Canal blockade, were transported along the 
dangerous Great North Road on trucks. The laying 
of the pipeline, which was completed sooner than 
forecast, comprised the clearing of the tropical 
forest, the excavation of a two-metre deep furrow 
and the positioning and welding of the pipes. The 
complex topography and the presence of game 
reserves, marshes and rivers made the enterprise 
particularly arduous. [Fig. 6, 7]
The pipeline, 1,680km-long and eight inches in 
diameter, carried refined oil products until 1975 
when, based on the trust earned from the pipeline 
construction, the ENI group was appointed to build 
the first refinery of Zambia. The refinery allowed 
Zambia to buy crude oil directly from oil-producing 
countries and thus cut its energy dependence from 
colonial dealers and the oil cartel. The completion 
of the pipeline first, and of the refinery a few years 
later, were indeed received by Zambians as the first 
step towards real economic independence. During 
the inauguration of the pipeline in September 1968, 
President Kaunda declared that ‘the completion 
of this pipeline … greatly improves the capacity 
to overcome our difficulties in the field of devel-
opment’ and that it ‘is an example of our serious 
intent to work together … to develop the basis of 
self-reliance.’37
With the construction of the new railway, presi-
dents Kaunda and Nyerere hoped to increase self 
reliance and to distribute development and indus-
trialisation to the sparsely inhabited but potentially 
fertile rural areas.30 However, neither Zambia 
nor Tanzania could count on sufficient capital or 
knowledge to undertake the construction of such 
large-scale infrastructure.31
The diplomatic effort carried out by the two coun-
tries to gather foreign aid and assistance led to an 
unexpected but paradigmatic African Cold War situ-
ation where global political tensions intertwined with 
struggles for decolonisation and independence.
In 1966, the Zambian government awarded the 
Italian National Hydrocarbons Agency ENI (Ente 
Nazionale Idrocarburi) a contract to construct an 
oil pipeline from Dar es Salaam to the Copperbelt 
mining area. The Italian company’s proposal unex-
pectedly defeated the bid of the British company 
Lonrho (London and Rhodesian Mining and Land 
Company), the historical industrial partner of the 
two Rhodesias during the colonial era.32
The railway project, on the other hand, had been 
dismissed by various western donors as uneco-
nomic and unnecessary. After the refusal of Britain, 
the USA and the Soviet Union, in 1967 the People’s 
Republic of China unexpectedly offered to build the 
rail link while the World Bank, adverse to the railway 
construction, but willing to participate in solving the 
crisis, granted loans to improve different sections of 
the Great North Road, renamed Tanzam Highway.33 
[Fig. 5]
Postcolonial logistics
Funding for the pipeline was raised by a consor-
tium of Italian banks and offered to Zambia and 
Tanzania on soft-loan terms34 while the engineering 
was carried out by SNAM PROGETTI, an affiliat of 
ENI. ENI, which promptly understood the commer-
cial potential of decolonisation, started investing 
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Fig. 5: The Dar es Salaam multimodal corridor. Source: Michael B. Gleave, ‘The Dar Es Salaam Transport Corridor: An 
Appraisal’, African Affairs 91, no. 363 (1992): 249–67.
Fig. 6: Construction of the Tazama Pipeline, 1967. Source: ENI Historical Archive, Rome.
78
in Dar es Salaam in 1970. The ‘mobile construc-
tion site’ proceeded at the average speed of three 
kilometres a day and reached the Zambian copper 
belt five years, three hundred bridges, twenty-one 
tunnels and ninety-three stations later. Together 
with the railroad, the project included the construc-
tion of peripheral infrastructure and services such 
as train stations, power plants, electric and water 
networks, offices, warehouses, workshops and 
industrial plants.
The Chinese state played a prominent role in all 
phases; it granted the interest-free loan and coor-
dinated the project from the initial survey to the 
construction. The working team of the People’s 
Republic of China deployed a labour-intensive 
strategy that was considered suitable for developing 
countries – Zambia, Tanzania, and China – with a 
shortage of capital and a surplus of underemployed 
manpower. Between twenty thousand and fifty thou-
sand Chinese workers, engineers, supervisors, and 
doctors were sent to Africa to build bridges, tunnels, 
workshops, offices, stations, and housing for the 
railway authority’s employees. The 310,000 tons of 
steel rails, together with cement and timber to inte-
grate the local production had also to be imported 
from China.42
The stations were designed following a modular 
scheme. The smaller stations, occurring most 
commonly, were mainly deployed in sparsely inhab-
ited areas. The L-shaped building was divided 
in two; half of the station served as waiting room, 
the other half as office space for railway workers. 
Medium-size villages were assigned medium-size 
stations, composed of a flexible number of modules 
articulated around the entrance space. The main 
stations, however, were specifically designed. 
Despite the fact that they had to cope with peculiar 
topographic and urban conditions, all main stations 
featured a monumental hall with a high ceiling and 
a glass façade. Other elements such as perforated 
The alignment and paving of the Tanzam 
highway started from Zambia and was completed 
in four years between 1968 and 1972. The World 
Bank’s role was to collect the capital and supervise 
the project from a legal and technical point of view. 
Funding came from the Swedish government, the 
US, the UK and the Bank itself. The World Bank, 
created in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference 
to increase global ‘productivity, employment, and 
living standards through international coopera-
tion’,38 provided loans and assistance to low-income 
countries in order to ‘foster an environment condu-
cive to private foreign investment’.39
The project of the highway was divided into 
sections, each of which was the object of separate 
calls for bids for engineering and construction. This 
procedure was intended to ‘enable smaller contrac-
tors to compete with larger firms and thereby help 
ensure competitive pricing’.40 Most of the contractors 
were foreign companies that imported machinery 
and experts and made little use of local labour.
Construction moved slowly towards the Indian 
Ocean. Some observers noted at the time that the 
highway construction sites were used by western 
donors and by the World Bank to control the Chinese 
operation in Tanzania and Zambia.41
The improvement of the Great North Road was 
the less spectacular of the interventions along the 
Dar es Salaam transport corridor; the highway didn’t 
require any secondary infrastructure and followed 
an existing road. However, after Rhodesia’s unilat-
eral declaration of independence and the rerouting 
of traffic toward Tanzania, the flow of trucks 
increased and the cities and the rural areas along 
the road became more and more linked to urban 
regions along the Rhodesia Railway.
After two years of negotiations and three years 
of surveys, the construction of the railway began 
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Fig. 7: The Tazama Pipeline and the Great North Road, 1967. Source: ENI Historical Archive, Rome.
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communist bloc, even more after receiving China’s 
assistance.49 [Fig. 8]
More than Communism, though, Maoist China 
needed to export goods and establish new political 
alliances. After the Sino-Soviet split of the early 60s 
and the US embargo, the People’s Republic of China 
was left politically and commercially isolated. The 
Chinese government, who lacked foreign currency 
to pay African workers and suppliers, proposed a 
commodity trading agreement to the Zambian and 
Tanzanian governments. The latter committed to 
selling, through their national wholesale corpora-
tions, a list of Chinese products whose revenues 
were used to pay salaries of African workers and 
local expenses.50 Initially criticised for their poor 
quality, Chinese beers, bicycles, napkins and other 
goods started filling the shelves of Zambian shops. 
After an initial resistance, willing or not, Zambian 
consumers got used to the new products that were 
shipped from China to Zambia through Dar es 
Salaam and on the Tazara wagons.51
This historical episode, that brought together 
three different and competing actors – ENI, the 
World Bank, and the People’s Republic of China – is 
paradigmatic of how the ‘Global Cold War’ unfolded 
outside the classic Eurocentric vision and deter-
mined neo-colonial dependencies.52 The creation 
of the non-aligned movement, which Zambia joined 
in 1964, did not spare the Third World from the 
imperialist aims of the ‘First’ and ‘Second World’ 
and decolonisation made Africa the perfect prey for 
the First and Second worlds’ hegemonic ambitions. 
With the withdrawal of colonial powers, emerged a 
new form of non-territorial conquest.
The competing actors involved in the rerouting 
of Zambian resources were all offering different 
recipes to achieve development. The railway 
and the highway, in particular, can be seen as an 
embodiment of the clash between a socialist vision 
panels, platform roofs and standardised graphic 
signage provided a uniform style to the different 
buildings. The overall consistent aesthetic of the 
Tazara (Tanzanian-Zambian Railway Authority) 
underlines its extra-statal nature: it is a territorial 
enclave designed by the People’s Republic of China 
and managed by the railway authority.43
The careful design of the passenger train stations 
suggests an additional purpose of the railway: 
to increase the mobility of people living along the 
corridor and enhance their economic opportuni-
ties. With the cooling of the geopolitical situation in 
Southern Africa and the liberalisation measures of 
the 1980s and 1990s, small dealers who couldn’t 
rent and fill entire cargo wagons, started shipping 
their goods as luggage on the passengers’ ‘ordinary 
train’. The ‘ordinary train’ became a moving market 
from which, twice a week, farmers and traders 
could buy and sell homegrown agricultural products 
or imported goods coming from the port of Dar es 
Salaam.44 The unforeseen use of the railway as a 
small-scale logistic device radically changed the life 
of people living along the corridor.
African Cold War
L’independence, c’est de bien calculer les interde-
pendences. (Tjibauou, 1996)45
The spectacular and intrepid construction of the 
railway was widely reported in the Chinese and 
international media where it was advertised as the 
‘friendship railway’, a ‘common third world struggle 
against the forces of neo-colonialism’46 based on 
solidarity among countries who shared a ‘history 
of imperial conquest and colonisation.’47 From 
the beginning of the Sino-African collaboration, 
Western newspapers envisioned what they called 
‘yellow peril’,48 the threat of communist propaganda 
and the spread of Maoism on the African conti-
nent. The Tanzanian and Zambian governments 
were indeed considered ideologically close to the 
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Fig. 8: Chinese poster depicting the construction of the Tazara railway, 1971. ‘Serve the revolutionary people of the 
world’. Source: Martin Bailey, Freedom railway (London: R. Collings, 1976).
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and that unity was the strongest weapon against 
imperialism.55 The ‘freedom railway’ was seen – in 
opposition to the colonial ‘Rhodesia Railway’ – as 
the symbol of Zambia’s decolonisation and freedom 
from the rule of the white-controlled south. Moreover, 
the newly established link between Zambia and 
Tanzania subverted the continental patterns of colo-
nial fragmentation and brought together two fellow 
countries which had been kept apart by historical 
contingencies and external interests.56
Independent Zambia inherited the territorial 
imbalance created by the Rhodesia railway and 
the demarcation of Crown land and native reserves 
with the majority of people, industries and services 
concentrated along the Rhodesia Railway. Once 
the colonial anti-migration law was abolished, the 
urban population along the railway grew at an 
impressive speed while, away from the railway 
line, people were living on subsistence agricul-
ture in the sparsely distributed villages and small 
towns.57 A large percentage of the population was 
isolated and, most importantly, was not contributing 
to the country’s wealth. Through the development 
of the corridor, the government was creating the 
conditions needed to transform subsistence agri-
culture into a cash crop economy and redefine 
national patterns of production and consumption. 
Furthermore, similar to the effect generated by the 
colonial railway, the Tazara was expected to attract 
the sparse population of the northwest province, 
making them easier to reach, control, tax and serve.
Within the nation-building process, the rail, the 
road and the pipeline served as a medium, but also 
as a message. Especially in the most remote and 
poorly served areas of the country, the newly built 
infrastructures became one of the few signs of the 
territorial presence of the new state. Indeed, both the 
railway and the pipeline were selected by Southern 
African and colonial military forces as a symbolic 
military target. Despite the protective fence installed 
of society, in which the state plays a prominent role 
and a capitalist vision of free-flowing commerce 
and increasing individual mobility.53 While China 
proposed independence as the result of a collec-
tive effort, roads and automobility were promoted 
by the West as an instrument of decolonisation and 
emancipation. Despite the colliding interest of the 
different actors involved, the three infrastructures all 
contributed to the transformation and reorientation 
of the Zambian territory and show how logistics had 
to cope with ‘political irrationalities’ and historical 
contingencies.
Territorial decolonisation: between panafri-
canism and nationalism
Even though the main goal of the ‘Dar corridor’ was 
the rerouting of copper and oil, the postcolonial 
regime conveyed the new infrastructure projects 
into narratives of Pan African unity and nationalist 
decolonisation. Within Zambia, the new infrastruc-
tures became the embodiment of nation building 
and reorganisation of the territorial structure inher-
ited from colonial planning.
Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere were strong 
supporters of the Pan-African ideals. They both 
believed in the principle of collective self-reliance 
and unity in opposition to colonial fragmentation, 
which they saw as the main reason for Africa’s 
underdevelopment. The idea, both material and 
utopian, that networks of exchange and trade 
would bring wealth and peace was not an inven-
tion of Pan-Africanist politicians and intellectuals. A 
diffuse Saint-Simonian blind faith in communication 
and transport networks characterised modernist 
theories of development from the late colonial era 
onwards.54
During the inauguration of the Tazara head station 
in Kapiri Mposhi, President Kaunda declared that 
linking the newly founded African states would invert 
the colonial ‘divide and rule’ balkanisation strategy 
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As Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system analysis 
suggests, within the logic of the global commodity 
market, different states occupy different positions. 
The role of the periphery is to provide raw materials 
and low value-added products for core countries 
that, by contrast, focus on higher-skill capital produc-
tion.62 This global spatial model clearly criticises the 
modernisation theory of progress as a temporal and 
univocal path from tradition to modernity according 
to which different areas of the world find themselves 
at different stages of development and move, at 
different speeds, towards the Euro-American living 
standards that they will reach at some point in time.63
Ironically, the struggle for independence and 
decolonised trade forced Zambia to open its doors 
to a set of new actors – foreign companies, foreign 
states and international organisations – who offered 
financial aid and technical support with the promise 
to enhance development and self-reliance. Fredrik 
Cooper’s definition of postcolonial ‘gatekeeper 
states’ perfectly matches the conditions of post-inde-
pendence Zambia where the price of and demand 
for copper, the state’s main source of revenue, 
depended purely on external factors.64 This fragile 
and externally oriented constellation forced the 
government ‘astride the interface between a territory 
and the rest of the world, [into] collecting and distrib-
uting resources that derived from the gate itself’: 
customs revenue and foreign aid.65 The manage-
ment of the export of resources and the supply of 
fossil fuels remained the main goal of the postcolo-
nial regime whose only ‘freedom’ was to choose its 
commercial partners and political models.
The newly founded Zambian state sought to 
decolonise its territorial imbalance with the same 
instruments previously deployed by the BSAC and 
by the colonial administration, and with the support 
of new international patrons. Willing to define its 
autorithy over land and population, the postcolo-
nial regime, unable to imagine alternative models 
around the pumping stations, the pipeline was 
already bombed during the night of Christmas 1969, 
while railway bridges were bombed repeatedly in 
1979, forcing the establishment of extraordinary 
security measures along the railway line.58
De-, Post- or Neo- Colonisation
The end of colonial direct domination marked the 
beginning of a phase that could ideally lead to 
radical political, economic and territorial redefini-
tions such as the constitution of a new continental 
political power or the reaffirmation of precolonial 
non-territorial strategies of government. In 1963 
Kwame Nkrumah – first president of Ghana and 
co-founder of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) – proposed the creation of a continental 
political subject in order to avoid the balkanisation 
of the continent into dozens of independent states. 
His idea of complete solidarity and political unity 
was soon dismissed and the OAU itself legitimised 
the creation of nation states and the inviolability of 
their boundaries.59
Despite the efforts of some of the most radical 
African leaders, the nation state emerged as the 
universal form of government. Indeed, independ-
ence was not a sudden episode; it was the peak of a 
long process and the result of precise calculations. 
Colonial powers gave up sovereignty only after 
creating the conditions for their profitable future 
relations with the former colonies. Such conditions 
included the establishment of a local political elite 
and the development of nationalist sentiments, 
which could only lead to the creation of modern 
nation states.60
Soon after independence, the nationalist ambi-
tion of Zambian self-reliance clashed with the new 
state’s difficulty to overcome its colonial cultural and 
territorial inheritance, and with the harsh reality and 
slowly-evolving extractive industry that relegated 
Zambia to the periphery of the global economy.61 
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